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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, : 
Petitioner-Appellee, : Case No. 910500 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
: Category No. 3 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden of the 
Utah State Prison, STATE OF : 
UTAH, 
Respondent-Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a decision granting in part and 
denying in part a petition for postconviction relief. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i) (1992) because the appeal is from a district court 
involving a capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
PRESENTED IN THE CROSS-APPEAL 
When reviewing an appeal from a denial of a 
postconviction petition, "we survey the record in the light most 
favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will not reverse 
if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial 
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted." 
Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658 (Utah 1989). This standard of 
review applies to all of the issues raised in petitioner's cross-
appeal, and, thus, all of the points of this brief. 
1. Point I is the reply brief in the State's appeal; 
consequently the issue presented and standards of review were 
previously given in the State's opening brief, 
2. Did the postconviction court correctly determine 
that counsel had not been ineffective in the enumerated areas? 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed questions of 
fact and law. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
3. Did the postconviction court properly deny the 
petition on the issue of the use of hypnotically refreshed 
testimony? This Court will not reverse denial of a petition "if 
there is a reasonable basis [in the record] to support the 
[postconviction] court's refusal to be convinced that the writ 
should be granted." Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658 (Utah 
1989). 
4. Did the postconviction court properly determine 
that the trial court was not required to advise petitioner that 
he did not have to testify at trial? The same standard from 
Medina applies. 
5. Did the postconviction court correctly determine 
that petitioner's right to be present at all critical stages of 
the proceedings was substantially observed? The same standard 
applies. 
6. Did the postconviction court correctly determine 
that the information about the victim disclosed to the jury did 
not warrant granting the petition? The same standard applies. 
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7• Did the postconviction court correctly determine 
that there was no basis at trial to instruct the jury on the 
mitigating factor of duress? The same standard applies. 
8. Did the postconviction court correctly determine 
that the trial court's rejection of petitioner's requested 
instruction that the jury had to find the existence of 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt was correct? 
The same standard applies. 
9. Did the postconviction court correctly deny 
petitioner's motion for appointment of investigators and expert 
witnesses at State expense? Whether there is a constitutional 
right to investigators and expert witnesses at postconviction 
proceedings is a legal conclusion. Legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 
P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case was presented in the State's 
opening brief and will not be repeated here. The trial court 
granted the petitioner's writ on two issues: 1) ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial regarding Dr. Heinbecker's 
testimony; and 2) ineffective assistance on appeal. Petitioner's 
cross-appeal addresses the additional issues of: 1) ineffective 
assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest and other 
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enumerated allegations of counsel errors; 2) use at trial of 
hypnotically enhanced testimony; 3) the trial court's failure to 
advise petitioner of a right to testify or to remain silent; 4) 
petitioner's right to be present at pretrial proceedings; 5) the 
jury's consideration of information about the victim; 6) the 
trial court's failure to instruct on all statutory mitigating 
circumstances; 7) the trial court's failure to instruct that the 
prosecution had to establish the existence of an aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt; and 8) violation of 
petitioner's constitutional rights by the postconviction court's 
refusal to appoint an investigator and expert witnesses for 
purposes of his postconviction claims. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 2, 1985, two officers from the Utah State 
Prison, Luther Hensley and Stan McAfee, delivered petitioner to 
the basement entrance of the Third District Court at about 8:55 
a.m. (Transcript of criminal trial [hereafter Tr.] 1981-85, 1996, 
2046, 2056, 1394). As the trio approached the elevators inside 
the foyer, petitioner turned and walked casually toward the 
drinking fountain (Tr. 1983, 1998, 2048, 2058). A woman standing 
near the fountain handed petitioner a handgun which he pointed 
toward the guards as he turned and moved toward them (Tr. 2001, 
2002, 2059-60, 2106-10). 
Petitioner fumbled with the gun as if it had been 
handed to him awkwardly (Tr. 2060). Petitioner's gun was a 
single-action .22 caliber revolver (Tr. 2363, 2368-69). Each 
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time the gun was fired, its hammer had to be cocked in a separate 
action (Tr- 2363). The gun will not fire without first being 
cocked (Tr. 2363, 2365-66). He advanced slowly on the guards who 
drew their weapons as they retreated out of the building (Tr. 
2002-03, 2061). Hensley fired at petitioner from outside the 
building, hitting petitioner in the shoulder/chest area (Tr. 
2023, 2152). Petitioner ducked into the door of the clerk's 
office where there were three attorneys, a court clerk and a 
uniformed prison employee (Tr. 2026, 2064, 2144-47, 2150-52). 
Petitioner first backed into the doorway and glanced at two of 
the attorneys who were trying to hide behind a door; then he 
moved out to the elevators and tried to push the call button (Tr. 
2152-53). When he could not reach the button, petitioner 
returned to the clerk's office (Tr. 2153-54). Petitioner looked 
at Robert Macri and Michael Burdell who were trying to hide 
behind the door. Petitioner pointed the gun at Macri, then, when 
Burdell said, "Oh, my God," petitioner aimed the gun at Burdell, 
said, "Oh, fu . . .," and fired (Tr. 2217, 2155-57, 2238). 
Meanwhile, Cathy Gallegos, who had been waiting for the 
elevator as petitioner and the guards walked into the building, 
managed to get inside and ride to the fifth floor (Tr. 2104, 
2112, 2116). Before she entered the elevator, Gallegos heard two 
shots but she did not know petitioner was wounded (Tr. 2110-11). 
As the elevator doors closed, she saw petitioner crouched, ready 
to fire (Tr. 2112). On the fifth floor, Gallegos told bailiff 
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Nick Kirk that she thought a guard had been shot (Tr. 2116-16, 
2271, 2273). 
Kirk, uniformed but unarmed, ran down the stairs to the 
basement where he saw petitioner standing inside the clerk's 
office (Tr. 2275). Kirk looked around for his judge and turned 
back to face petitioner (Tr. 2275-77). Petitioner raised the 
gun, aimed at Kirk, and shot him in the stomach (Tr. 2277). Kirk 
slumped to the floor (Tr. 2278). 
Moving back inside the clerk's office, petitioner told 
Richard Thomas, a prison employee, to come with him and show the 
way out (Tr. 2251, 2278-79). Thomas stepped over Burdell and 
Kirk and led petitioner back out of the office doors to the 
stairwell (Tr. 2163, 2252, 2254). 
Petitioner climbed the stairs to the second floor where 
he accosted Wilburn Miller near the exit (Tr. 2255, 2289, 2295). 
Waving the gun, he told Miller to help him and said, "You are 
next. Walk with me." (Tr. 2297, 2308). They went outside where 
Miller broke away, ran back into the building, and dived through 
a cashier window (Tr. 2297-99). Petitioner proceeded to the 
front lawn of the courthouse where he was apprehended (Tr. 2313-
15). Petitioner was bleeding from his shoulder and said he could 
not breathe. He had a blank facial expression, seemed calm and 
gave no indication of pain (Tr. 2315-17, 2332). He smiled a 
couple of times (Tr. 2071, 2333). 
The woman who passed the gun to petitioner also hid a 
duffel bag filled with clothing, a hunting knife, a role of duct 
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tape and a ski mask in the women's restroom before petitioner 
arrived (Tr. 2059-60, 2135-36, 2145, 2171-72). Petitioner 
admitted that he had planned an escape which closely matched the 
events of April 2, 1985 (Tr. 2305-08, 2421, 2444). He claimed, 
however, that he was surprised by the woman with the gun and that 
he was unfamiliar with the gun (Tr. 2411, 2413). He complained 
that he was a nervous wreck and did not recall most of what 
happened (Tr. 2415-16, 2422, 2454), although he did recall 
shooting Kirk, talking to Thomas and Miller and walking up the 
stairs (Tr. 2426-29, 2422). He also admitted that he walked 
toward the drinking fountain to further his plan to escape and 
that he thought that the woman, whom he would not identify, was 
there to shield a weapon (Tr. 2441-42). 
In the hospital, defendant told Wayne Jorgensen, a 
prison guard, that he would have shot Hensley, but the gun would 
not fire, even though he kept pulling the trigger (Tr. 2482). He 
said he shot Burdell because he thought Burdell looked as though 
he would jump on him (Tr. 2486). Petitioner declared that he 
would have killed anyone who tried to stop him or get in his way 
and that he hated prison (Tr. 2487-88). Petitioner also said he 
did not know he was shot until he was outside and people were 
screaming at him to drop the gun (Tr. 2487). 
Michael Burdell was dead on arrival at the hospital 
(Tr. 2351). Nick Kirk recovered from his injuries (Tr. 2280). 
The jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder, attempted 
first degree murder, aggravated kidnaping, escape, and possession 
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of a dangerous weapon by an inmate. They imposed the death 
penalty for first degree murder. This Court affirmed 
petitioner's convictions and death sentence on January 31, 1989, 
and denied rehearing on November 15, 1989. The United States 
Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari on April 
16, 1990. See State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's trial counsel did not provide ineffective 
assistance. Petitioner has not shown that they were laboring 
under any actual conflict of interest; consequently, petitioner 
was obligated to show prejudice to establish ineffective 
assistance. The postconviction court determined that there was 
no prejudice in the areas petitioner raises as conflicts. 
Regarding the other claims of ineffective assistance, 
petitioner has shown no prejudice, even in the areas in which the 
postconviction court determined that they may have been deficient 
performance. Specifically, petitioner has shown neither 
deficient performance nor prejudice in the manner in which trial 
counsel presented the defense that the shooting was 
unintentional. Secondly, the advice that petitioner testify at 
trial was sound trial strategy and not ineffective assistance. 
Thirdly, counsel was not ineffective for introducing petitioner's 
prior criminal history on direct examination. Case law at the 
time of petitioner's trial had not precluded their introduction. 
In any event, even if counsel's performance were deficient, the 
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evidence of petitioner's guilt was such that no prejudice was 
established. Next, at the time of trial, there was no 
requirement to request a bifurcated guilt phase to avoid 
introduction of previous convictions. Consequently, it was not 
ineffective assistance to fail to ask for bifurcation. 
The use of hypnotically refreshed testimony was error 
but harmless. The tainted testimony was not critical and did not 
vary significantly from the pre-hypnosis testimony; in addition, 
it was merely cumulative to the testimony of another witness who 
was not tainted. 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that it was error for 
the trial court to fail to advise petitioner that he did not have 
to testify. 
Petitioner has also not demonstrated that his right to 
be present at all critical stages of the proceedings was 
violated. He was present at the hearings on his motions for 
recusal and for change of venue. He has presented no analysis or 
argument to support his claim that he had the right to be present 
when the trial court reviewed exhibits. 
Information about the victim which was disclosed to the 
jury was minimal and was not violative of the law in effect at 
that time. The postconviction correctly declined to apply 
subsequent contrary case law retroactively. 
Refusal to instruct the jury on the statutory 
mitigating factor of duress was correct because the term must 
consist of threatening third person conduct which produces a 
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reasonable fear of immediate harm. This is consistent with the 
context of the statutory language and precludes petitioner's 
argument that his wound caused "stress" which constituted duress. 
The law does not require an instruction that the jury 
had to find the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt; consequently, it was not grounds for 
postconviction relief to refuse to so instruct the jury. 
Any constitutional right to appointment of 
investigators or expert witnesses at state expense applies only 
to trial and first appeal of right. The right does not extend to 
discretionary postconviction proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF OF APPELLEE ON 
THE ISSUES OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN THE 
PENALTY PHASE AND ON APPEAL 
The first two points of petitioner's brief comprise his 
response to appellant's opening brief. This point will serve as 
appellant's reply brief. 
A. Penalty phase 
In response to the State's appellant's brief, 
petitioner maintains that the prejudice prong of the effective 
assistance test is met because trial counsel did not call a 
psychologist to present more evidence of "organic brain 
syndrome." As noted in the State's opening brief, trial counsel 
contacted several mental health specialists to find someone who 
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would testify on petitioner's behalf; they were singularly 
unsuccessful. 
There is no evidence that petitioner actually has 
organic brain syndrome; although there was some suggestion at 
trial of brain damage (Tr. 2796). The weight of the evidence in 
the trial record indicates that petitioner does not have organic 
brain syndrome (Tr. 2810, 2811, 2816). Dr. Heinbecker never 
testified that he would have concluded differently given more 
time and information, only that he "would have liked to have 
planned the evaluation more carefully." (Evidentiary hearing on 
postconviction petition [hereafter H.] 216). Petitioner's 
arguments are based on sheer speculation and do not support a 
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Frame/ 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (1986) (claim must be a demonstrative reality). 
B. On appeal 
Petitioner claims that Edward Brass was operating under 
an actual conflict of interest because he had represented the 
codefendant, the woman accused of supplying the gun (whose case 
was resolved separately from petitioner's). The postconviction 
court concluded that there was no conflict because of the prior 
representation of the codefendant (Memorandum Decision at 27; 
Addendum). Because petitioner has not challenged this 
conclusion, his claim of an actual conflict based on multiple 
representation should be rejected. As noted in Point II, only if 
there is an actual conflict of interest which adversely affects 
counsel's performance is prejudice presumed. Cuvler v. Sullivan, 
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446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). Since the postconviction court found 
no actual conflict, the burden was on petitioner to establish 
prejudice; he has failed to do so. 
INTRODUCTION TO BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE 
The remaining points of this brief respond to the 
issues raised by petitioner in his cross-appeal on the claims 
rejected by the postconviction court. Except for the claims 
raised under Points III and X of petitioner's brief, i.e., the 
claims surrounding ineffective assistance of counsel and the 
refusal to appoint investigators and expert witnesses for 
postconviction proceedings, the issues could and should have been 
raised by petitioner in his direct appeal. As the State argued 
below, these claims are procedurally barred and this Court should 
reject them on that basis. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 
1035-36 (Utah 1989); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
1983); Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah), cert, denied, 449 
U.S. 891 (1980). 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT TRIAL 
COUNSEL DID NOT HAVE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
AND DID NOT PROVIDE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL IN THE AREAS STATED IN POINT III OF 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
The court denied postconviction relief on several other 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In general, 
when reviewing an appeal from a denial of a postconviction 
petition, appellate courts "survey the record in the light most 
favorable to the findings and judgment; and . . . will not 
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reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the 
trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be 
granted." Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658 (Utah 1989). 
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed 
questions of fact and law. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984)). This Court has adopted a two-part test for determining 
ineffectiveness from Strickland. That test is: 
"First, the [petitioner] must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the 'counsel' guaranteed the [petitioner] by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
[petitioner] must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were 
so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of 
a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable." 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
Petitioner has the burden of meeting both parts of the 
test. 
[I]n order to meet the first part of this 
test a [petitioner] must "identify the acts 
or omissions" which, under the circumstances, 
"show that counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." . . . The appellate court 
must . . . "indulge in the strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance; 
that is the [petitioner] must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, 
the challenged action 'might be considered 
sound trial strategy.'" 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-
90). The standard for judging counsel's performance is that of 
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reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. To prove 
prejudice, petitioner 
"must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." 
Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
"[T]hese principles are not to be applied as a 
mechanical test." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
This Court 
"need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient before examining 
the prejudice suffered by [petitioner] as a 
result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If 
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, 
that course should be followed." 
Id. at 405 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
A. Conflict of interest 
Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel had a 
conflict of interest which deprived petitioner of his 
constitutional right to counsel. On this issue, the court 
stated: 
Based on the briefs submitted, this Court is 
of the opinion that the problems regarding 
the Valdezes [trial counsel, Andrew and James 
Valdez] representing petitioner was [sic] 
discussed with petitioner and petitioner 
waived any issue of conflict of interest and 
petitioner agreed to allow the Valdezes to 
continue their representation of petitioner. 
There is still the issue whether 
independent counsel's advice should have been 
provided to petitioner to advise him of the 
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implications of the conflict of interest 
problem. The Court rules though there may be 
some evidence of a conflict and as a result, 
some deficiency in representation, because of 
the weight of the direct evidence of 
petitioner's guilt, there is no prejudice 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(Memorandum Decision at pp. 22-23; Addendum).1 
*The memorandum decision has raised the question of whether 
the court applied a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to 
petitioner's burden to show prejudice in an ineffective 
assistance claim (Brief of Cross-Appellant at 37). The court's 
syntax is confusing at best. In ruling on the first issue, use 
of hypnotically enhanced testimony, the court found "the 
admission of such alleged testimony was harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (Memorandum Decision at 9; Addendum A). That 
clause should be read that the court found admission of the 
testimony to be error but that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of the same sentence, the 
court stated, "[T]here is no likelihood the result would have 
been any different for either the guilt or penalty phase beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (Memorandum Decision at 9; Addendum A). Again 
the confusing statement should be read that the court found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no likelihood of a 
different result. 
On the next issue, failure to advise of a right to 
testify, the court found that the failure was not error, "and if 
it was, it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, based on 
the weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt." 
(Memorandum Decision at 10; Addendum A). The court again was 
ruling that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; 
there is no indication that it was imposing a reasonable doubt 
burden on petitioner. 
On the issue of petitioner's right to be present, the 
court found that there was no violation, "and if there was, it 
was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt based on the weight 
of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt" (Memorandum 
Decision at 12; Addendum A). The reasonable doubt standard was 
imposed on the showing that any error was harmless, not on 
petitioner. 
The court imposed the same standard on the harmless 
error analysis in the issues of consideration of the victim's 
character (Memorandum Decision at 13; Addendum A), and failure to 
instruct on statutory mitigating circumstances (Memorandum 
Decision at 31; Addendum A). The court stated no standard when 
it found that there was no ineffectiveness in the way the defense 
that the killing was unintentional was presented, in the failure 
to object to the hypnotically enhanced testimony, and in the 
advice that petitioner testify; it merely stated that prejudice 
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had not been established because of the weight of the evidence of 
petitioner's guilt (Memorandum Decision at 15-16; Addendum A). 
In contrast, the court stated that other 
ineffectiveness claims may have indicated some deficiency but 
counsel's actions were not prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(Memorandum Decision at 19, 21
 f 23, 26). Other issues do not 
even mention the prejudice prong. 
In light of this confusion, petitioner claims that the 
court applied an "erroneous legal standard in requiring Mr. 
Gardner to show beyond a reasonable doubt the result would have 
been different but for counsel's errors and omissions." (Brief 
of Cross-Appellant at 37). Since the decision states the court's 
conclusion about whether any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt or whether there was, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
no likelihood of a different result in a variety of ways, this 
Court must determine whether an erroneous standard was applied or 
merely whether the court's drafting was poor. 
The court was never asked to impose a reasonable doubt 
burden on the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness claim and 
the majority of the statements regarding that burden refer to a 
finding of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt because of the 
weight of the direct evidence of guilt. The few times the court 
seems to be saying that petitioner had to prove prejudice beyond 
a reasonable doubt should be read as findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt that there was no prejudice. 
This conclusion is supported by the court's 
summarization of its decision. The court stated: 
Because many of the contentions were resolved 
by this Court on the basis of harmless error 
and thus no prejudice beyond a reasonable 
doubt because of the great weight of the 
direct evidence, petitioner no doubt queries 
how many harmless errors need there be to 
constitute deprivation of due process. . . . 
The Court has weighed each independently, and 
collectively, and still finds that the weight 
of the direct evidence is so great that the 
collective effect is still insufficient to 
overcome the overwhelming direct evidence of 
petitioner's guilt. 
Particularly in respect to the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, the Court has 
found no prejudice to petitioner beyond a 
reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming 
direct evidence of guilt. 
(Memorandum Decision at 32; Addendum A). The court's finding of 
"overwhelming direct evidence of guilt," read in the context of 
the convoluted syntax, demonstrates that the court was not 
imposing a reasonable doubt standard on petitioner's burden to 
establish prejudice. Instead, the court found beyond a 
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Petitioner's claim of conflict of interest has three 
components: 1) counsel should have withdrawn because they were 
potential witnesses; 2) counsel should have withdrawn because 
they knew the bailiff who was wounded by petitioner after the 
murder; and 3) there was animosity between petitioner and 
counsel, particularly Andrew Valdez. 
1. Counsel as witnesses 
The vast majority of the cases regarding conflict of 
interest involve joint representation of codefendants, or counsel 
having also represented a potential witness for the prosecution. 
The claim raised heref that counsel themselves were potential 
witnesses, is rare and little case law was found to give 
guidance. The claim arises from rule 3.7, Rules of Professional 
Conduct,2 which states: "A lawyer shall not act as advocate at 
a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary 
witness[.]" As the Utah Court of Appeals stated in State v. 
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991): 
While violation of the Rules does not "create 
any presumption that a legal duty has been 
breached" or provide a basis for civil 
liability, Scope, Utah R. Prof. Conduct, 
courts have referred to the Rules to augment 
legal principles involving lawyer conduct. 
Id. at 489. 
reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice because of the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
2The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the earlier 
Utah Canons of Professional Responsibility. 
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The legal principles involving conflict of interest 
arise most often in multiple representation cases. The impact of 
multiple representation on the effective assistance of counsel 
was addressed in Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), in 
which the Supreme Court stated: 
In order to establish a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no 
objection at trial must demonstrate that an 
actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer's performance. 
Id. at 348 (footnote omitted). The Court also stated that 
a defendant who shows that a conflict of 
interest actually affected the adequacy of 
his representation need not demonstrate 
prejudice in order to obtain relief. . . . 
But until a defendant shows that his counsel 
actively represented conflicting interests, 
he has not established the constitutional 
predicate for his claim of ineffective 
assistance. 
Id. at 349-50 (citing Hollowav v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487-91 
(1978) and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72-75 (1942)). 
The mere "possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a 
criminal conviction." Cuvler, 446 U.S. at 350. See also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (conflict of 
interest warranting a presumption of prejudice is limited to 
"when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest."). 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed an alleged conflict 
of interest in State v. Hovt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1991), in a 
claim that trial counsel had a conflict because she had applied 
and interviewed for a position with the county attorney's office 
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handling the prosecution. The court stated that in order to 
succeed on the claim 
defendant must "point to specific instances 
in the record to suggest an actual conflict 
or impairment of his or her interests. . . ." 
. . . Defendant cannot claim error based on 
the mere appearance or hypothetical existence 
of conflict. 
Id. at 212 (citing State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75 (Utah App. 
1990)). This statement, while not controlling in this Court, is 
a logical and appropriate burden to place on a petitioner 
requesting a reversal of his conviction and sentence on the basis 
of conflict of interest in his counsel. 
Petitioner has failed to carry this burden. The mere 
fact that his counsel had seen him shortly after the shooting did 
not make them "necessary" witnesses and does not establish an 
actual conflict or impairment of petitioner's interests. In 
State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985), this Court stated 
"that it is error for counsel to continue representation where he 
or she is or ought to be a witness with respect to issues that 
are not incidental or insignificant." JEci. at 653. However, in 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), the 
Court said: 
we deem it to be generally inadvisable for 
members of the bar to testify in litigation 
where they personally represent a party. The 
need for the testimony of counsel must be 
compelling and must be necessary to preserve 
the cause of action as set forth in rule 
Id. at 1066 (emphasis added). Counsel should not be witnesses 
every time they have some information regarding a case; the rule 
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requires a showing that the lawyer is "likely to be a necessary 
witness[.]" Utah R. Prof, Cond. 3.7(a) (emphasis added). 
The only evidence regarding whether the trial counsel 
were necessary witnesses came from counsel themselves. Counsel 
were not necessary witnesses because of their minimal contact 
with petitioner on the grounds of the courthouse and the fact 
that their concern and focus was on each other's welfare and not 
on petitioner (H. 137). Andrew Valdez testified that his own 
observations of petitioner that morning "might have" cut against 
the defense used, i.e., that petitioner was unaware of his 
actions because of his wound (H. 137). James Valdez testified 
that he had nothing to add in the way of evidence because he saw 
petitioner after the fact and would not have been able to 
indicate petitioner's state of mind at the time of the murder (H. 
199). Since counsel were not necessary and compelled witnesses, 
there was no actual conflict in their representation of 
petitioner. 
2. Counsel knew the injured bailiff 
Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel had a 
conflict because they knew the bailiff shot by petitioner and 
other court personnel who were witnesses. Petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate how that knowledge raised any actual conflict of 
interest which adversely affected his counsel's performance; 
consequently, he has failed to establish "the constitutional 
predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance." Cuvler, 446 
U.S. at 350. 
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3. Animosity between counsel and petitioner 
The final conflict claim is that there was animosity 
between petitioner and his counsel, specifically Andrew Valdez. 
Again, petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his relationship 
with his counsel raised any actual conflict of interest which 
adversely affected counsel's performance. At the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, petitioner testified that he asked Valdez to 
withdraw because: 1) he felt Valdez was not keeping him 
informed, 2) petitioner did not like his conditions of 
confinement, 3) petitioner did not want his mother to testify, 
and 4) petitioner did not want to testify (H. 87-91). Petitioner 
did not convey his problems with counsel to the trial judge (H. 
87). His counsel agreed that petitioner had expressed 
frustration with his confinement conditions and had had 
"problems" with the presentation of penalty phase witnesses (H. 
117) . 
Petitioner has not established that his rocky 
relationship with counsel adversely affected counsel's 
performance. He has shown no specific instances where an alleged 
failure to keep petitioner informed adversely affected the 
proceedings. Likewise, there is no demonstration that the 
dispute about his confinement raised ineffective assistance; 
indeed, counsel persuaded petitioner not to plead guilty during 
trial when petitioner wanted to do so solely to avoid the 
confinement conditions. Petitioner's mother did not testify at 
the trial and petitioner admits that ultimately it was his own 
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decision to testify (H. 91). Petitioner has not demonstrated 
that that decision, whether "coerced" by counsel or not, was the 
basis for an ineffective assistance claim. 
B. Other claims of ineffective assistance 
Petitioner next challenges the postconviction court's 
ruling that several other allegations of ineffective assistance 
of counsel did not justify relief. 
Petitioner's first claim is that counsel failed to 
adequately present the defense that he shot Burdell as a reaction 
to having been wounded. The postconviction court concluded that 
even if there had been deficient performance in this area, the 
direct evidence of petitioner's guilt was so overwhelming that no 
prejudice was established (Memorandum Decision at 14-15; 
Addendum). 
Petitioner speculates that there was other evidence 
counsel could have presented to support this claim. However, he 
failed to establish the existence of any evidence that a 
ballistics expert or thoracic specialist might offer to support 
the theory and obtain a different result at trial. Indeed, 
Andrew Valdez testified that counsel looked for evidence to 
support the theory; however, the medical personnel at the 
hospital where petitioner was taken weakened that theory. 
"Basically they indicated that he was very lucid and knew what he 
was doing." (H. 132). Thus, petitioner has failed to establish 
either a deficiency in counsel's representation or prejudice. 
Speculation about a different outcome is insufficient to 
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establish that counsel was inadequate. State v. Buelr 700 P.2d 
701 (Utah 1985); State v. White, 671 P.2d 191 (Utah 1983). The 
claim must be a demonstrable reality. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Secondly, petitioner argues that counsel's advice that 
petitioner should testify established constitutionally inadequate 
representation. Counsel testified that there was no way to 
present petitioner's state of mind to the jury other than by 
petitioner's own testimony (H. 175-76). He also stated that 
petitioner wanted his story told and counsel did not think he 
could have kept petitioner off of the stand (H. 157, 176). 
Petitioner admitted he made the decision to testify (H. 93). In 
the face of the evidence from which the jury could infer that 
petitioner intended to kill Burdell, petitioner's testimony was 
the only evidence that would give the jury a different view of 
the events. Even if experts could have shared some insight into 
the possible effects of petitioner's wound, only petitioner could 
say what he actually experienced. The postconviction court found 
no deficient performance or prejudice in this strategy 
(Memorandum Decision at 16; Addendum). 
The advice given by counsel was sound and was a 
legitimate tactical decision. Counsel's strategic decisions are 
not grounds for an ineffectiveness finding. State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 
(1990); Buel, 700 P.2d at 701; State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59 
(Utah 1982). There is a strong presumption that counsel's 
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decisions on what theories of defense to pursue were tactical. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160; State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Utah 1987); Buel, 700 P.2d at 703. Attorneys are given broad 
discretion to make strategic choices at trial and courts should 
not evaluate their decisions using the benefit of hindsight. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91. The fact that counsel's chosen 
strategy did not produce the desired result does not lead to a 
conclusion of ineffectiveness. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160; Medina, 
738 P.2d at 1023-24; Buel, 700 P.2d at 703. 
In fact, counsel prepared petitioner well for the 
prospect of testifying. Another attorney, Ron Yengich, consulted 
about the decision and engaged petitioner in mock cross 
examination (H. 154-55). Counsel also informed petitioner that 
he would be asked to reveal the identity of his accomplice and 
that failure to do so would hurt petitioner (H. 155). Although 
counsel also knew that Wayne Jorgensen's testimony about what 
defendant had told him at the hospital where petitioner recovered 
from his wound3 would be used to rebut petitioner's testimony, 
counsel believed Jorgensen was impeachable (H. 153). Jorgensen 
was questioned by counsel regarding the fact that he did not come 
forward with his information immediately, nor prepare any kind of 
report at the time of the statements (H. 153, Tr. 2491). 
3Jorgensen testified that petitioner said he shot Burdell 
because he thought he looked as though he would jump petitioner 
(Tr. 2486). Petitioner also told Jorgensen that he would have 
killed anyone who tried to stop him or get in his way (Tr. 2487-
88). 
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A defendant claiming that he disagreed with counsel's 
approach at the time of trial generally must have registered a 
complaint about that approach at the time of trial in order to 
preserve the claim. Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023. If the conflict 
arose out of a dispute about what witnesses to present and what 
defenses to raise, courts usually do not look behind the 
decisions of trial counsel even if a complaint was registered at 
trial. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 
459 U.S. 988 (1982). The fact remains that petitioner chose to 
testify and registered no complaints during trial. 
Thirdly, petitioner contends that counsel was 
ineffective for introducing petitioner's prior criminal history 
on direct examination. The postconviction court again found 
that, even though counsel's performance may have been deficient, 
the evidence of petitioner's guilt was so strong that there was, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, no prejudice (Memorandum Decision at 
19; Addendum). 
Petitioner asserts that the convictions were 
inadmissible. Under recent case law, the State would be required 
to show that the probative value of petitioner's criminal history 
outweighed its prejudicial effect on petitioner before it could 
introduce the evidence to impeach. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1986). Also, the State, if trying this case today, 
would be precluded from using convictions for theft, robbery and 
burglary unless there was evidence that the crimes involved 
dishonesty or false statements or were otherwise more probative 
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than prejudicial. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989). 
However, the case law interpreting rule 609, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, was not in existence at the time of petitioner's trial. 
Prior to 1986, despite the commentators' notes to rule 609, 
courts had not applied the rule any differently than the previous 
rule which allowed admission of all of a defendant's felony 
criminal history as impeachment. See Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334, 
n. 40 and n. 45. Moreover, case law existing at the time of 
trial specifically defined crimes such as theft, robbery and 
burglary as crimes of dishonesty. See State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 
33, 34 (Utah 1984). Even though Cintron was decided under the 
former rules of evidence, the language of former rule 21 was 
exactly the same as rule 609(a). Utah's adoption of the federal 
definition of crimes of dishonesty in Bruce and State v. Lanier, 
778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989), was a clear break with this past rule; a 
break which occurred after petitioner's trial. 
Additionally, it is not clear that petitioner's 
criminal history would have been excluded. Counsel did discuss 
the introduction of the evidence and the State's agreement that 
the prosecutor would not delve into the details of the crimes 
(Tr. 2396). Had the issue been presented to the trial court, it 
might very well have concluded that, petitioner's criminal 
history being so extensive, he had a motive to fabricate his 
testimony to avoid a first degree murder conviction and potential 
death sentence and found that the evidence was very probative. 
Petitioner had nothing to lose and everything to gain by lying. 
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Furthermore, the jury was already aware that petitioner had some 
sort of criminal history since he was escaping from prison at the 
time he shot Burdell and two robbery convictions were admitted to 
establish an aggravating circumstance. Admission of petitioner's 
additional criminal history was harmless in the face of the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt. Petitioner has failed to 
establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's introduction of the 
evidence. 
Next, petitioner claims that he was prejudiced by 
counsel's failure to request a bifurcated guilt phase to avoid 
introduction of his previous convictions that were used as an 
aggravating circumstance of first degree murder. The 
postconviction court found no requirement to make such a request; 
consequently, there was no deficient performance. Neither was 
there prejudice because of the evidence of petitioner's guilt 
(Memorandum Decision at 19; Addendum). 
At the time of petitioner's trial, courts were not 
required to bifurcate the guilt phase of a trial where the 
previous convictions were introduced to establish an element of 
the charged offense. In State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 
1989), this Court required for the first time that a first degree 
murder trial be bifurcated to avoid exposing the jury to evidence 
of previous criminal history before they determine whether a 
defendant killed intentionally. Notably, the Court in 
petitioner's case refused to reach this issue based upon a lack 
of prejudice resulting from the "overwhelming direct evidence" of 
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petitioner's guilt. Gardner, 789 P.2d at 279. Finally, given 
that defendant was in custody and shackled at the time of the 
escape and murder, the jury would have had to have been aware 
that petitioner had some criminal history/ 
Because petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 
postconviction court's ruling that counsel was not ineffective in 
these areas was erroneous, this Court should affirm that 
decision. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED POSTCONVICTION 
RELIEF ON THE ISSUE OF THE USE OF 
HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY 
There is no question that hypnotically enhanced 
testimony is inadmissible at trial. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 
1203, 1210 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990); State 
v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1989). Anything recalled 
by a witness only after hypnosis must be suppressed; however, a 
witness who has been hypnotized may testify to his pre-hypnosis 
recollections as they were recorded before hypnosis. Tuttle, 780 
P.2d at 1211. Admission of posthypnotic recall can be harmless 
error so long as it appears unlikely beyond a reasonable doubt 
^Petitioner has apparently abandoned some of his claims of 
ineffective assistance. Claims addressed below under this rubric 
but not addressed on appeal are: 1) counsel's failure to object 
to Macri's hypnotically refreshed testimony; 2) counsel's failure 
to assure that all disagreements between petitioner and counsel 
were made part of the record; 3) counsel's failure to challenge 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(c) as an aggravating factor; 4) 
counsel's failure to make an opening statement at the penalty 
phase; and 5) counsel's failure to adequately voir dire the jury. 
The postconviction court found no prejudice in these claims 
(Memorandum Decision at 26-27; Addendum A). 
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that the result of the trial would have been different- Id. at 
1213. This depends upon factors such as "the importance of the 
witness's testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, 
whether the testimony was corroborated or contradicted, and the 
overall strength of the State's case." Id. 
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing 
established that Robert Macri, a witness at trial, underwent 
hypnosis after the preliminary hearing and prior to trial (H. 27, 
47, 60). Although there were no video or audio tapes of the 
session, both Mr. Macri and the hypnotist, Dr. Elliott Landau, 
testified that no facts were suggested to Mr. Macri (H. 47-48, 
66-68). In fact, Dr. Landau asked only general questions such 
as, "Can you see where you are?" (H. 63). He asked no questions 
of Mr. Macri regarding the facts of the shooting of Michael 
Burdell (H. 48, 64-65, 69). Some time after he was hypnotized, 
Mr. Macri claims to have recalled that he closed the door of the 
clerk's office as he ran out of the room (H. 28-29). 
The postconviction court agreed that use of 
posthypnotic testimony was error; however, the court concluded 
that the testimony was not critical and its admission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Memorandum Decision at 8-9; 
Addendum). This conclusion is amply supported by the record. 
This aspect of Robert Macri's testimony was not critical to the 
State's case. Another witness testified to defendant's actions 
in the clerk's office. Ed Seamons observed petitioner as he 
aimed the gun at Burdell's head from within one foot and paused a 
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second or two before firing (Tr. 2156-57, 2202). Seamons said 
that Macri immediately pushed the door closed, running around it 
and out of the room (Tr. 2158). Seamons's testimony not only 
rendered Macri's trial testimony about how the door closed 
cumulative, it corroborated Macri's trial testimony. There is no 
allegation that Seamons' testimony was tainted by hypnosis or 
that it changed between preliminary hearing and trial. 
Significantly, Macri's trial testimony was not 
"dramatically different" from his preliminary hearing testimony 
as petitioner alleges. At preliminary hearing, Macri described 
feeling exposed to petitioner either by the door closing or by 
petitioner moving far enough into the room to look behind the 
door (Preliminary hearing transcript [hereafter P.H.] 971-72). 
In both instances, Macri stated that petitioner looked at him and 
Burdell and said, "Oh fu . . ." (P.H. 948, Tr. 2238). Seamons 
confirmed petitioner's exclamation (Tr. 2155). According to 
Macri at both hearings, petitioner then pointed the gun at Macri, 
but moved it toward Burdell when Burdell let out an exclamation 
(P.H. 949, Tr. 2217). Only then did petitioner fire the gun. 
Additionally, Seamons explained that petitioner had 
backed into the room once before and had looked at the two 
attorneys before going back out to the elevator (Tr. 2151-53). 
At the elevator, petitioner tried to push the buttons but his 
arms were restrained by the waist shackle and he was unable to 
reach the buttons (Tr. 2153). When petitioner returned to the 
clerk's office (Tr. 2153), then, he already knew the two 
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attorneys were there. Petitioner was not surprised by their 
presence behind the door. 
The State's case against petitioner was very strong in 
other respects. First, there was no question of identity; 
petitioner was escaping from custody at the time of the shooting. 
There was other evidence of petitioner's intent; he raised the 
gun from a relaxed position and shot a uniformed bailiff almost 
immediately after shooting Burdell (Tr. 2006-07, 2277). 
Petitioner's gun had to be intentionally cocked in a separate 
action each time he fired it (Tr. 2363). Petitioner took a 
hostage from the clerk's office and up the stairs (Tr. 2251-52, 
2254, 2278-79, 2163). Once up the stairs, petitioner took 
another hostage, telling him, "You are next. Walk with me" (Tr. 
2297). All of these events occurred within moments of the 
initial escape (Tr. 1995, 2038-41, 2056, 2209, 2246, 2303-04, 
2312-13); an escape which petitioner had planned (Tr. 2405-08, 
2433, 2442). 
Even if petitioner fired the gun as a reaction to the 
door's movement, that fact does not negate his intent to kill. 
Petitioner was voluntarily engaged in an attempt to escape 
custody. He had already seen the two men behind the door the 
first time he entered the room. Simply because he fired the gun 
in reaction to movement does not mean he did not form the intent 
to kill whoever he perceived was making a move toward him from 
behind the door. As he stated to Jorgensen, petitioner would 
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have killed anyone who tried to stop him from escaping (Tr. 2486-
87). 
Tuttle does not require reversal where the use of 
hypnotically refreshed testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 780 P.2d at 1213. One reason petitioner claims that the 
testimony was harmful is that none of the suggested safeguards 
for testing the reliability of Macri's testimony were followed. 
Petitioner overlooks that we do have a recording of Macri's pre-
hypnosis recall—the preliminary hearing transcript. The only 
difference between the two versions of events is that by the time 
of trial, Macri was sure how the door was closed. As 
demonstrated above, this fact was insignificant, was cumulative 
to other testimony and was corroborated by other testimony. 
Moreover, it did nothing to negate evidence of petitioner's 
intent to kill. 
In short, petitioner's attempt to fashion the "swinging 
door" into a defense in the postconviction proceeding is not 
supported by any of the evidence presented at either the 
preliminary hearing or the trial. Macri's belated recollection 
about how the door closed was insignificant and the fact that it 
may have been produced by hypnosis does not warrant granting 
postconviction relief; as the postconviction court determined, 
there is no likelihood of a different trial result absent Macri's 
testimony about the door. 
-32-
POINT IV 
THE POSTCONVICTION COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ADVISE 
PETITIONER THAT HE DID NOT HAVE TO TESTIFY 
Petitioner claims that the postconviction court should 
have granted relief because the trial court did not advise 
petitioner "concerning his right to testify or remain silent" 
(Brief of Cross-Appellant at 48-49). The postconviction court 
determined that the trial court's failure to advise concerning a 
right to testify was not error or, at most, harmless error 
(Memorandum Decision at 10; Addendum). 
The cases cited by petitioner do not support his claim 
that the trial court had an obligation to advise defendant about 
a right to testify. The United States Supreme Court cases cited 
stand for the propositions that: 1) the State may not 
arbitrarily limit the constitutional right to testify on one's 
own behalf, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); 2) a state rule 
requiring defendant to testify before calling other defense 
witnesses or be precluded from testifying violates a 
constitutional right to silence, Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 
605 (1972); and 3) a state law requiring response to questioning 
by a referee violates a constitutional right to silence, Mallov 
v. Hocxan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). None of these cases address 
petitioner's claim. 
The Colorado case cited also is unavailing. People v. 
Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), declares that the right to 
testify is so fundamental that its waiver requires testing by the 
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same constitutional standards applied to waiver of the right to 
counsel. In Curtis, the defendant's right to testify overrode 
his counsel's advice to waive the right. Id. at 514. Waiver of 
the right to testify may require a colloquy establishing 
knowledge and voluntariness; there is no similar colloquy 
requirement for a decision to. testify. Consequently, there was 
no constitutional violation because the court did not advise 
petitioner that he did not have to testify. 
POINT V 
THE POSTCONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT ALL 
CRITICAL STAGES OF THE PROCEEDINGS WAS 
SUBSTANTIALLY OBSERVED 
Respondent agrees that a criminal defendant has a right 
to be present at all critical stages of the criminal proceeding. 
However, the postconviction court correctly determined that this 
right was not infringed (Memorandum Decision at 11-12; Addendum). 
The trial transcripts indicate that there were two hearings on 
motions to recuse the trial judge (Tr. 1105-24, 1125-36). These 
hearings were held on July 12 and July 17, 1985. The record 
indicates on both days that petitioner was present (Tr. 1105, 
1125). At his request, petitioner left the hearing on July 12; 
however, that was only after the court continued the hearing to 
the later date. Further argument on petitioner's motion was 
conducted on July 17 and the decision rendered on the later date 
(Tr. 1136-37). The hearing on the motion for a change of venue 
was held on August 5, 1985, and the record shows that petitioner 
was present at that hearing (Tr. 1149). Since petitioner was 
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present at the hearings at which his motions were argued and 
decided, there was no violation of a right to presence. 
Petitioner has presented no analysis, case law, or 
argument to support a claim that the court's review of exhibits 
without counsel or petitioner being present was a violation of a 
constitutional right. This Court may decline to address this 
issue on that basis alone. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Neither has petitioner demonstrated error in the 
postconviction court's decision that the right to presence was 
substantially observed. He has pointed to nothing in the record 
that conflicts with that finding. 
POINT VI 
THE POSTCONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE INFORMATION DISCLOSED TO THE JURY 
ABOUT THE VICTIM DOES NOT WARRANT GRANTING 
THE RELIEF REQUESTED 
Petitioner maintains that the postconviction court 
erred in determining that the evidence or argument presented 
about the victim's character did not justify postconviction 
relief. The two cases relied on by petitioner, South Carolina v. 
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 
(1987), had not been decided at the time of petitioner's trial, 
and were subsequently overruled in Payne v. Tennessee, U.S. 
, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1992). What existed prior to Booth to 
guide prosecutors in selecting appropriate argument to capital 
juries is best demonstrated by reference to the dissenting 
opinion in Gathers. As the dissenters noted, the Supreme Court 
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"has long recognized that retribution itself is a valid 
penological goal of the death penalty." Gathers, 490 U.S. at 818 
(O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, 
Powell and Stevens, JJ.)). Prior to the decisions in Booth and 
Gathers, prosecutors were justified in arguing that retribution 
for the harm done to the victim and his family or friends was an 
appropriate factor for jurors to consider. 
In Booth, the Court held that a victim impact statement 
could not be given to the jury in the sentencing phase of a 
capital case. The Court's concern was that the jury would focus 
on the impact of the victim's death upon his family members as 
emphasized by an extensive written statement, and choose to 
impose the death penalty as a result of that impact rather than 
as a result of the jury's reasoned moral response to the 
defendant and his crime. 482 U.S. at 505. The Court held that 
Maryland's capital sentencing statute requiring the jury to 
consider such information was unconstitutional. 
In Gathers, the Court upheld the South Carolina Supreme 
Court's reversal of a death sentence where the State had 
introduced extensive evidence establishing that the victim was a 
religious man. The State had argued extensively that death 
should be imposed upon Gathers because the victim was a 
registered voter, a religious man who carried a prayer card with 
him at all times, and one who cared about the community. 109 S. 
Ct. at 2210. The Court was concerned that the jury focused upon 
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the victim's characteristics rather than upon those of the 
defendant at the penalty phase. 
The postconviction court in the present case found no 
reason to try to apply Gathers and Booth retroactively because 
the emphasis on Burdell's character was "minimal in comparison to 
the total evidence presented, and was further minimized by the 
instructions given" (Memorandum Decision at 13; Addendum). Even 
if those cases had been applied retroactively, the facts of the 
present case would not violate their holdings. In this case, the 
prosecutor did not focus extensively on the victim's 
characteristics at the penalty phase of the trial; in fact, he 
made no mention of those characteristics at the penalty phase. 
He referenced them only minimally at the guilt phase (Tr. 2533-
34). Neither Booth nor Gathers indicate that any reference 
whatsoever to the victim's life is always reversible error. Both 
cases involved extensive evidence which was stressed to the jury 
at the penalty phase of the trial. Here, the prosecutor's 
remarks were a relatively minor portion of his argument at the 
guilt phase. Certainly neither case requires that the prosecutor 
not point out that the victim had a general right to live. This 
was the thrust of the reference rather than that petitioner 
should be convicted because Burdell was a particular type of 
person. Also, the instruction regarding the use of sympathy and 
sentiment was given at the penalty phase as one of petitioner's 
requested instructions (R. 528). At the guilt phase, the jury 
was instructed that statements of counsel are not evidence (R. 
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560). Thus, the jury could not have concluded that they were to 
regard counsel's argument as evidence of aggravation in the 
penalty phase. 
Given the minimal reference at trial to the victim's 
character, the postconviction court properly concluded that there 
was no error in the information disclosed to the jury; and, if 
there were, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
(Memorandum Decision at 13; Addendum). 
POINT VII 
THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED ON ALL APPROPRIATE 
STATUTORY MITIGATING FACTORS 
The postconviction court concluded that the statutory 
mitigating factor regarding extreme duress was not supported by 
the evidence and thus was properly rejected by the trial court5 
(Memorandum Decision at 30-31; Addendum). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
207(2)(c) (1990) indicates that mitigating factors for purposes 
of capital sentencing include that "[t]he defendant acted under 
extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another 
personf.J" Petitioner argues that "duress" should be construed 
to include the "stress" caused by petitioner's wound. This 
5Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990) lists certain aggravating 
circumstances which elevate an intentional or knowing killing to 
a capital offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1990) also speaks 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which a fact-finder 
may consider in determining the appropriate sentence after a 
defendant has been adjudged guilty of the capital offense. For 
purposes of clarity, this brief shall refer to the aggravating 
circumstances for determining guilt as "circumstances;" the 
circumstances applicable to the sentencing provision shall be 
referred to as "factors." 
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tortured reading of the concept of "duress" is not supported by 
case law. 
The term "duress" has been defined in the context of 
the statutory defense to criminal prosecution of compulsion or 
duress. In State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986), this Court 
adopted a modified test to evaluate a claim of a defense of 
duress to a charge of escape from prison. The first factor in 
the test, as adopted from People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 
118 Cal.Rptr. 110 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1974), is that the person 
"is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack 
or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future[.]" 
Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d at 831-32, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 115. As the 
Arizona Court of Appeals said in State v. Lamar, 144 Ariz. 490, 
698 P.2d 735 (Ariz. App. 1984): 
Duress envisions a third person compelling a 
person by the threat of immediate physical 
violence to commit a crime against another 
person or the property of another person. 
Id., 144 Ariz, at 497, 698 P.2d at 742. The Alaska Court of 
Appeals in Betzner v. State, 768 P.2d 1150 (Alaska App. 1989), 
stated: 
"Duress must consist of threatening conduct 
which produces in the defendant a reasonable 
fear of immediate or imminent death or 
serious bodily harm." 
Id. at 1155 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook of Criminal 
Law § 49 (1972)). See also United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 
922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980) 
("Basically a defense of duress or coercion requires that there 
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be an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm which 
requires the defendant to commit the criminal act, and it must be 
in a situation in which there was no opportunity to avoid the 
danger.•')• 
The definition of duress requiring a threat by a third 
person parallels the rest of the clause in the capital sentencing 
statute containing the duress language. Subsection 76-3-
207(2)(c) involves proof that petitioner acted under extreme 
duress "or under the substantial domination of another person[.]" 
In order for an instruction to be given regarding this 
subsection, evidence of duress or force from a third party was 
required. No such evidence was presented and the court properly 
rejected the requested instruction. 
In addition, the jury was instructed that it could 
consider any other facts in aggravation or mitigation along with 
the specifically listed factors (R. 613). The jury was also told 
it could consider in mitigation any other factors which did not 
justify or excuse the crime but which they might consider as 
extenuating or reducing moral culpability (R. 614). They were 
further told that the four listed factors were only examples of 
some of the factors they might consider in mitigation (R. 616). 
Thus, the jury was free to consider whether the fact that 
petitioner had been wounded mitigated against the death penalty. 
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POINT VIII 
THE POSTCONVICTION COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S REJECTION OF 
PETITIONER'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION THAT THE 
JURY HAD TO FIND THE EXISTENCE OF AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT WAS 
CORRECT 
Petitioner next challenges the postconviction court's 
determination that the trial court properly rejected petitioner's 
requested instruction that the jury had to find the existence of 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt (Memorandum 
Decision at 31-32; Addendum). Petitioner's argument is based 
upon two isolated sentences within two cases which were decided 
after this Court reviewed petitioner's case. E.g., State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1989). Neither case suggests that the jury must be 
separately instructed to find the existence of aggravating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt when they have been instructed 
in compliance with State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). The Wood standard requires the jury 
to find that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation beyond 
a reasonable doubt and that death is the appropriate penalty in 
the circumstances of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
necessary implication of a Wood instruction is that the jury must 
first find that aggravation exists before it can weigh the 
aggravation against the mitigation. No Utah case, however, has 
ever required that the jury be separately instructed that they 
may only consider aggravation which they find to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has 
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never imposed such a requirement. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862, 874-75 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
POINT IX 
DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO APPOINT INVESTIGATORS 
AND EXPERT WITNESSES DID NOT VIOLATE 
PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A month after filing his petition for postconviction 
relief, petitioner filed a separate motion seeking appointment of 
an investigator and expert witnesses at state expense. This 
motion was denied. Petitioner argues that the failure to provide 
investigators and expert witnesses violated his constitutional 
rights to the effective assistance of counsel and due process. 
Rule 54(d)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that M[c]osts against the state of Utah, its officers and 
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law." 
Since petitioner is proceeding under rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to obtain postconviction relief, this action is 
governed by the rules of civil procedure. Thus, petitioner must 
establish that the costs he requested were "permitted by law." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990) delineates the 
"[m]inimum standards provided by county for defense of indigent 
defendants." It reads: 
The following are minimum standards to be 
provided by each county, city and town for 
the defense of indigent persons in criminal 
cases in the courts and various 
administrative bodies of the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent 
person who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of his 
liberty; 
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(2) Afford timely representation by 
competent legal counsel; 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other 
facilities necessary for a complete 
defense: 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense 
counsel to the client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal 
of right and the prosecuting of other 
remedies before or after a conviction, 
considered by the defending counsel to be 
in the interest of justice except for 
other and subsequent discretionary appeals 
or discretionary writ proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (emphasis added). This section 
specifically states that these standards are to be provided for 
"the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases." The present 
case is not a criminal proceeding; neither is petitioner the 
defendant in this action which is a collateral civil proceeding 
brought by petitioner. The right to appointed counsel "applies 
only in criminal prosecutions, not civil actions." Walker v. 
Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Utah App. 1987). 
By its own operation, § 77-32-1 does not apply to 
collateral civil proceedings. Subsection 5 specifically excludes 
discretionary writ proceedings. To provide meaning to the phrase 
"discretionary writ proceedings," the Court should look to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-32-3 (1990), which provides: 
An assigned counsel shall not have the 
duty or power under this section to represent 
an indigent defendant in any discretionary 
appeal or action for a discretionary writ, 
other than in a meaningful first appeal of 
right to assure the indigent defendant an 
adequate opportunity to present his claims 
fairly in the context of the appellate 
process of this state. 
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This section reiterates that discretionary writs are 
postconviction actions other than those included in the original 
appellate process. The present proceeding is not part of the 
first appeal of right from a criminal conviction; instead, it is 
an appeal in a collateral civil proceeding. Section 77-32-3, 
read together with § 77-32-1, supports the postconviction court's 
refusal to order the State to pay the costs of investigators and 
expert witnesses for petitioner. 
On appeal, and without citing to the Utah law set out 
above, petitioner argues that denial of investigators and expert 
witnesses deprived him of a constitutional right to due process 
and effective assistance of counsel. For support, he cites Ake 
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), a case in which the United 
States Supreme Court held that when a criminal "defendant has 
made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the 
offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the 
Constitution requires that a State provide access to a 
psychiatrist's assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot 
otherwise afford one." JId. at 74. Ake does not stand for the 
proposition that a petitioner is entitled to a psychiatrist's 
assistance in a collateral postconviction proceeding. Petitioner 
has provided no legal analysis supporting his extension of the 
holding of Ake to collateral proceedings. 
Comparing this argument to United States Supreme Court 
cases regarding right to counsel, this extension is unwarranted. 
For nearly twenty years, the Supreme Court has refused to extend 
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its right to counsel holdings in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), to 
collateral proceedings. In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), 
the Court held that neither the due process nor the equal 
protection clauses require states to provide counsel to an 
indigent defendant on a discretionary appeal to a state supreme 
court or on a petition for certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court. Jld.. at 610-12. The policy behind this refusal to 
extend the right to counsel is: 
We do not believe that the Due Process 
Clause requires North Carolina to provide 
respondent with counsel on his discretionary 
appeal to the State Supreme Court. At the 
trial stage of a criminal proceeding, the 
right of an indigent defendant to counsel is 
fundamental and binding upon the States by 
virtue of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Gideon[ 372 U.S. 335] . . . But 
there are significant differences between the 
trial and appellate stages of a criminal 
proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage 
from the State's point of view is to convert 
a criminal defendant from a person presumed 
innocent to one found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. To accomplish this 
purpose, the State employs a prosecuting 
attorney who presents evidence to the court, 
challenges any witnesses offered by the 
defendant, argues rulings of the court, and 
makes direct arguments to the court and jury 
seeking to persuade them of the defendant's 
guilt. Under these circumstances "reason and 
reflection require us to recognize that in 
our adversary system of criminal justice, any 
person haled into court, who is too poor to 
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided for him." jid. at 
344[.] 
By contrast, it is ordinarily the 
defendant, rather than the State, who 
initiates the appellate process, seeking not 
to fend off the efforts of the State's 
prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding 
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of guilt made by a judge or a jury below. 
The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not 
as a shield to protect him against being 
"haled into court" by the State and stripped 
of his presumption of innocence, but rather 
as a sword to upset the prior determination 
of guilt. This difference is significant 
for, while no one would agree that the State 
may simply dispense with the trial stage of 
proceedings without a criminal defendant's 
consent, it is clear that the State need not 
provide any appeal at all. McKane v. 
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S. Ct. 913, 38 
L.Ed. 867 (1894). The fact that an appeal 
has been provided does not automatically mean 
that a State then acts unfairly by refusing 
to provide counsel to indigent defendants at 
every stage of the way, 
Ross, 417 U.S. at 610-11 (emphasis in original). The Court 
stated that it did not intend to "discourage" states which have, 
"as a matter of legislative choice, made counsel available to 
convicted defendants at all stages of judicial review." Id., at 
618. However, that choice is "a matter of legislative policy[.]" 
id. 
In Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982), the Court 
reiterated that 
[s]ince respondent had no constitutional 
right to counsel [to pursue discretionary 
state appeals or applications for review in 
the United States Supreme Court], he could 
not be deprived of the effective assistance 
of counsel[.] 
Id. at 587-88. Relying on this series of cases, the Court in 
Pennsylvania v. Finlev, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), said: 
We think that since a defendant has no 
federal constitutional right to counsel when 
pursuing a discretionary appeal on direct 
review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has 
no such right when attacking a conviction 
-46-
that has long since become final upon 
exhaustion of the appellate process. 
Id. at 555 (emphasis in original). After restating the analysis 
given in Ross, the Court continued: 
Postconviction relief is even further removed 
from the criminal trial than is discretionary 
direct review. It is not part of the 
criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact 
considered to be civil in nature. . . . It 
is a collateral attack that normally occurs 
only after the defendant has failed to secure 
relief through direct review of his 
conviction. States have no obligation to 
provide this avenue of relief, . . . and when 
they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by 
the Due Process Clause does not require that 
the State supply a lawyer as well. 
Id. at 556-57 (citations omitted). Neither was the "equal 
protection guarantee of 'meaningful access' violated" by refusal 
to provide counsel in postconviction proceedings. I^d. at 557. 
In Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, the Court extended 
Finlev to capital cases. The Court further said: 
If, as we said in Barefoot v. Estelle, [463 
U.S. 880 (1983)], direct appeal is the 
primary avenue for review of capital cases as 
well as other sentences, Virginia may quite 
sensibly decide to concentrate the resources 
it devotes to providing attorneys for capital 
defendants at the trial and appellate stages 
of a capital proceeding. Capable lawyering 
there would mean fewer colorable claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to be 
litigated on collateral attack. 
Id. at 11. 
The United States Supreme Court has given sound policy 
reasons for its refusal to extend a right to appointed counsel at 
the trial and first appeal stages to discretionary and collateral 
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proceedings* These policy reasons also apply to the appointment 
of investigators and expert witnesses. 
Petitioner had an opportunity at trial to present 
evidence about his mental state at the time of the murder. His 
counsel presented the best evidence they had of his mental state; 
petitioner testified as to his thought processes, and another 
witness testified that petitioner looked "confused" (Tr. at 
1260). When asked at the postconviction evidentiary hearing 
about calling expert witnesses to "bolster" the theory that the 
shooting was not intentional, Andrew Valdez testified that "[i]t 
was hard to bolster that theory" (H. 132). 
We couldn't get medical doctors from the 
University of Utah to support that. 
Basically they indicated that he was very 
lucid and knew what he was doing. 
(H. 132). Expert evidence to support petitioner's theory that he 
was confused and fired the gun unintentionally would have been 
belied by the testimony of the medical personnel who actually 
worked with petitioner after the shooting. Given the evidence 
forthcoming from people who observed petitioner at the time of 
the crime and shortly after, it is highly speculative that expert 
witnesses in this postconviction proceeding could have provided 
any testimony that would form the basis for granting the 
petition. 
In one sentence, petitioner's brief intimates that the 
failure to appoint expert psychiatric assistance also deprived 
him of the effective assistance of counsel (Brief of Cross-
Appellant at 59-60). As noted above, there is no constitutional 
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right to counsel in discretionary postconviction proceedings; 
consequently, any right to psychiatric assistance based on a 
right to counsel does not attach to these proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the portion of the decision of the trial 
court granting postconviction relief and affirm the portion of 
the decision which denied such relief. 
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ADDENDUM 
JUL 3 0 1991 
OFFICE Or 
ATTORNEY GENSFttL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden of 
Utah State Prison, State of 
Utah, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 900904092 
Petitioner Ronnie Lee Gardner's evidentiary hearing on 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or for Post Conviction 
Relief was heard by this Court on November 27 and 28, 1990. 
Petitioner was present and represented by his attorneys Craig 
L. Truman, Karen A. Chaney and Manny Garcia. The State was 
represented by Sandra L. Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General. 
Witnesses were called, sworn and testified, evidence taken and 
the matter submitted to the Court subject to further sxibmission 
of written closing briefs. 
The petitioner's brief was to be submitted by January 30, 
1991, the State's opposition brief was to be submitted by March 
1, 1991, and petitioner's reply brief was to be submitted by 
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March 20, 1991. These dates were extended to February 13, 1991 
for petitioner, March 15, 1991 for State's response, and April 
3, 1991 for petitioner's reply brief. All briefs have now been 
submitted. The preparation of this Memorandum Decision was 
based entirely on the hearings held on November 27 and 28, 
1990, the submitted briefs, the Court's understanding of the 
law as stated in the briefs, and inferences drawn from the 
facts as recited in the briefs and evidence presented before 
this Court. The petitioner has made many sound arguments 
supported by the facts and cited case law, and the respondent 
has just as ably responded and particularly pointed out the 
great weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt, the 
impact of which has made rendering a just and fair decision for 
all concerned inordinately difficult. The Court now having 
considered the evidence, the briefs, and all other pertinent 
matters, finds and rules as follows: 
Petitioner frames the following issues to be resolved by 
this Court. (A) Use of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony; (D) 
Failure to Advise Mr. Gardner Concerning His Right to Testify; 
(E) Violation of Right to Presence; (F) Consideration of 
Victim's Character; (H) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at 
Trial (excluding subparagraph (5) Jorgensen testimony); (I) 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal; (J) Failure to 
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Instruct Jury on Statutory Mitigating Circumstances; and (K) 
Failure to Instruct Jury on the Burden as to Existence of 
Aggravating Circumstances. After careful consideration of the 
files, pleadings and arguments, and over the respondent's 
objections, the Court agrees with petitioner. Therefore, the 
Court will consider the above issues. 
(A) USE OF HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY 
There is no dispute that hypnotically enhanced testimony is 
inadmissible in Utah. (Briefs filed by petitioner and 
respondent). One issue presented to this Court is whether 
petitioner's conviction must be vacated because it was based on 
allegedly inadmissible hypnotically enhanced testimony. 
Petitioner makes a forceful argument on the alleged 
post-hypnotic enhancement testimony of Robert Macri. Thus, 
this Court must first determine what was the nature of such 
alleged post-hypnotic enhancement testimony. The hypnosis 
session was not carefully documented, as pointed out by 
petitioner, and# thus, the traditional safeguards were not 
present. It would appear the session was more relaxed and 
informal as suggested by the testimonies of Macri and Dr. 
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Elliott Landau, lending more credence to Dr. Landau's 
observation that the session was more to discuss domestic 
matters than to prepare for any legal proceeding. 
Consequently, the normal safeguards were not adhered to to 
preserve the purpose, communication and content of the hypnosis 
session. 
What was the time frame when the post-hypnotic testimony 
was recalled? The recollection did not occur during or even 
immediately after the hypnosis session. It occurred suddenly 
while traveling with a friend in a car during a trip to 
California. There was an intervening period of time which had 
elapsed. During that intervening lapse of time, no one can 
surmise what independent or interactive forces may have 
influenced Macri's thought processes. 
It is difficult to determine what Macri's thought processes 
were during this critical time period. Doubtless, he had 
thought about the tragic events either consciously or 
subconsciously on numerous occasions subsequent to the day Mr. 
Michael Burdell was killed. Other than his own testimony, 
there is no evidence presented that the hypnosis was directly 
responsible for any change in Maori's testimony. Based on the 
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Court's observation, the change in testimony may have been 
induced by merely a natural sequence of events, regardless of 
any hypnosis. 
The recollection may have come about by subconscious or 
even conscious process of elimination. After mentally 
reviewing the various scenarios, Macri may have finally 
concluded his trial testimony seemed most logical. The 
resulting confidence in his changed testimony may be because he 
personally felt this testimony was the correct version, not 
necessarily because of post-hypnotic suggestion. 
Witnesses' testimony may differ or change for many 
reasons. Witnesses who see an event simultaneously, at the 
same place and vantage point, may not testify exactly the same 
on one or more or even any critical issues. They may modify or 
alter their testimony because of many reasons, one of which is 
being examined and cross-examined on the witness stand at 
different hearings. The various questions at different times 
may reinforce or confuse or erode the memory of a witness. 
What accurately triggers a witness' thought process on any 
occurrence which is unrehearsed, unexpected, life-threatening 
and transpires in a matter of seconds depends on the totality 
of circumstances involving the witness and the factors which 
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impinge on those circumstances, such as fear, excitement, 
actions of others, and so forth. Maori's testimony may have 
been influenced by such factors. 
After hearing the testimonies of Maori and Dr. Landau, this 
Court is not convinced the alleged post-hypnotic enhancement 
should be given the weight petitioner suggests. The purpose 
and content of the hypnosis session was vague and inconclusive 
at most. Whatever influence the post-hypnotic enhancement may 
have had is shrouded in mystery created by Macri. At this 
stage, this Court is not convinced, based on the evidence 
presented, that hypnosis was the primary or direct cause of the 
change in Maori's testimony from the preliminary hearing to the 
trial. 
Let us, however, consider petitioner's argument that there 
was inadmissible post-hypnotic enhancement in Macri's 
testimony. There were discrepancies in the testimony of Macri 
and Ed Seamons in the timing of the closing of the door and the 
number of times petitioner entered the clerk's office. In the 
timing of the closing of the door, both have changed their 
testimony. Macri changed his testimony from the preliminary 
hearing based on the alleged post-hypnotic enhancement and 
testified he shut the door after the weapon was fired rather 
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than petitioner firing the weapon simultaneously when the door 
was closed. During the trial, Seamons' changed his testimony 
from the weapon being fired simultaneously as the door was 
closed, before a lunch recess, to the weapon was fired after 
the door was closed, after the lunch recess. If Maori's 
post-hypnotic enhancement testimony was not admitted, 
petitioner would be in a position to argue his theory that the 
firing of the weapon was unintentional because he was startled 
when he saw Macri and Burdell simultaneously when the door was 
closing and thus was surprised and the weapon went off 
unintentionally. 
There is one more step to support the unintentional firing 
of the weapon. Macri has testified petitioner entered the 
clerk's office only once and was surprised to see Macri and 
Burdell behind the door. Contrarily, Seamons has testified 
petitioner entered twice and therefore was not surprised to see 
Macri and Burdell in the office. 
Finally, there is raised the issue of the distance of the 
witnesses and the strategic position of each. Based on what 
has been presented to this Court, Seamons was in a better 
position to view what was happening to both petitioner, Macri 
and Burdell, in spite of Macri's "fading away" contention. 
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Overall, Seamons' testimony is more consistent. Maori's memory 
appears faulty not only in recollecting what happened at the 
scene, but also regarding his hypnosis session with Dr. Landau, 
his conversations about the hypnosis with defense counsel Andy 
Valdez, and prosecutor Robert Stott. 
Taking into consideration the totality of events and 
circumstances, the Court agrees with respondent's contention 
that Mr. Macri's testimony was helpful, but not critical to the 
prosecution's case. The petitioner was in the process of an 
escape, and knew or should have known the risks and dangers 
inherent in such a venture, particularly at the courthouse. 
The petitioner was armed with a single-action .22 caliber 
revolver that needed to be cocked each time it was fired. In a 
short time sequence after shooting Mr. Burdell, he shot bailiff 
Nick Kirk; required Richard Thomas, a uniformed prison employee 
to show him directions to the stairwell; climbed the stairs to 
the second floor where he accosted and threatened Wilbur Miller 
to accompany him outside; and proceeded to attempt to escape to 
the outside lawn where he was apprehended. All of this in 
spite of being wounded (respondent's brief, pp. 6-9). Thus, it 
is the Court's opinion, the jury could infer from the evidence, 
that his actions reflect more his desperate nature at each step 
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of his attempted escape from the time he was handed the weapon, 
that he possessed the clear and unequivocal intention to 
perform any act which would accomplish his escape, even to 
discharge his weapon when surprised or threatened and to kill 
or injure any intruder or person who may be an obstacle to his 
escape. Therefore, contrary to the petitioner's contention, 
based on the facts of this case, this Court agrees with 
respondent's characterization that whether petitioner was 
startled into firing the gun when the door was closed is not as 
relevant as he would attempt to suggest. 
There is no dispute post-hypnotically enhanced testimony is 
inadmissible. Such alleged testimony was introduced in this 
case. Such alleged testimony was inadmissible. The Court 
rules, however, the admission of such alleged testimony was 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because of the nature 
of Maori's testimony, it was cumulative, it was corroborated 
and the weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt, 
and, even in the absence of Macri's post-hypnotically enhanced 
testimony, there is no likelihood the result would have been 
any different for either the guilt or penalty phase beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
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(D) FAILURE TO ADVISE MR. GARDNER CONCERNING HIS RIGHT TO 
TESTIFY 
The Court is of the opinion the trial court was not 
required to obtain a formal waiver of the defendant's right to 
remain silent before he testified. Petitioner points out in 
People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), that defendant 
should be free from any influence by his counsel whether he 
testifies or not. This procedure as a matter of course is 
manifestly a protection for the defendant, but as pointed out 
by the State, is not required. This Court agrees. As pointed 
out by the State: 
Petitioner claimed only that he felt he was 
coerced into testifying at guilt phase when he 
would rather not have testified. This is not the 
same issue. Petitioner did not claim that he 
wanted to testify at the penalty hearing but was 
prevented form doing so by counsel. Thus, 
petitioner has raised no claim regarding his 
right to testify in his own defense. 
The Court rules the failure to advise petitioner concerning 
his right to testify was not error, and if it was, it was 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the weight 
of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt. 
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(E) VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO PRESENCE 
Although petitioner contends that a violation of the 
accused's right to presence cannot be harmless in a capital 
case, this Court is of the opinion that petitioner's right to 
be present at all critical stages of the proceeding was 
substantially observed. Petitioner first argues his right to 
presence was violated when he left the courtroom before the 
completion of the hearing on the Request for Recusal. There 
apparently was a record of this hearing and petitioner has not 
shown how much longer the hearing continued, what transpired 
during the balance of the hearing in his absence and 
demonstrate in some way that his absence from the balance of 
the hearing prejudiced or could have prejudiced him in any 
way. Thus, the Court sees no violation of petitioner's right 
to presence. 
Second, petitioner argues that the Court's failing to view 
the evidence and rule on the Motion for Change of Venue in 
petitioner's presence violated his right to presence. Here, 
again, the Court is of the opinion that there was no violation 
of petitioner's right to presence. The Court agrees with 
respondent there was no violation of petitioner's right to be 
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present where the Court reviews exhibits submitted to it in the 
party's absence. Further, on the Motion for a Change of Venue 
held on August 5, 1985, the record indicates petitioner was 
present (respondent's brief, p. 21). Thus, the Court sees no 
deprivation of petitioner's right to presence. 
Thus, in sum, the Court rules there was no violation of 
petitioner's right to presence, and if there was, it was 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt based on the weight of 
the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt. 
(F) CONSIDERATION OF VICTIM'S CHARACTER 
The Court is of the opinion petitioner is not entitled to 
relief based on information disclosed to the jury about the 
victim. The Court is of the opinion the disclosure on 
Burdell's life was minimal and not of such prejudice to require 
a new trial. Although petitioner contends that Booth v. 
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 
490 U.S. , 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), "do 
not depend on the quantity of evidence about the victim's good 
character,11 and further that the risk of the death penalty 
being imposed was enhanced because petitioner "was not allowed 
GARDNER V. HOLDEN PAGE 13 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to present testimony in mitigation from Mr. Burdell's friends 
and relatives that a life sentence was appropriate" does not 
persuade this Court to rule that references to Burdell's 
character requires a granting of a new trial. Although the 
quantity of evidence about the victim's good character should 
not be a determining factor, the Court is of the opinion that 
the extensiveness and stress placed on character and effect on 
family and community was minimal in comparison to the total 
evidence presented, and was further minimized by the 
instructions given (See (J) below). Consequently, it is not 
necessary to apply Booth and Gathers retroactively. 
Thus, the Court rules there was no error on information 
disclosed to the jury, and if there was, it was harmless error 
beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the weight of the direct 
evidence of petitioner's guilt. 
(H) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL (EXCLUDING 
SUBPARAGRAPH (5), JORGENSEN TESTIMONY) 
As pointed out in respondent's brief, there is a strong 
presumption of counsel's competency. Strickland v. Washington, 
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466 U.S. 668 (1984). Petitioner has the burden to demonstrate 
counsel's representation failed to meet this objective standard 
of reasonableness. Codiana v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101-09 (Utah 
1983). The two prongs that petitioner must establish under the 
Strickland test is that counsel's performance was less than 
that expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and that 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the 
trial. Speculation about a different outcome is insufficient 
to establish that counsel was inadequate. State v. Buel, 700 
P.2d 701 (Utah 1985); State v. White. 671 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1983). The claim must be a demonstrative reality. State v. 
Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
a. Guilt Phase 
First claim: The Court is of the opinion counsel's failure 
to adequately present the defense that petitioner shot Burdell 
unintentionally as a reaction to having been shot has 
previously been discussed under the Post-Hypnotically Enhanced 
Testimony section above, and that discussion is applicable 
here. Although there may be some deficiency in failing to 
adequately present this defense, there is no prejudice because 
of the weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt. 
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Further, petitioner disputes respondent's claim of failing 
to show prejudice because of petitioner's failure "to present 
ballistics or other expert testimony to illustrate the impact 
of his wound." Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to 
make adequate preparation for such testimony and respondent 
vigorously objected to providing funds for petitioner to secure 
expert testimony in his defense. Related to this is counsel's 
failure to describe petitioner's shoulder wound as a wound to 
the chest and lung. Petitioner's arguments have merit. The 
merit of petitioner's argument must be weighed against the 
direct evidence of petitioner's guilt. As previously 
mentioned, the aggressive and unhesitating conduct of 
petitioner in pursuing his escape convinces this Court that 
although there may be some deficiency in counsel's 
representation, it does not establish prejudice because of the 
weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt. 
Second claim: Counsel's failure to object to Macri's 
hypnotically enhanced testimony has previously been discussed 
as mentioned above and that discussion is also applicable 
here. The Court agrees with respondent that "this failure may 
establish some deficiency in counsel's performance, it does not 
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establish prejudice to petitioner," In addition, nothing in 
petitioner's words or deeds during his escape betrayed his 
desperate and ill-conceived plan to escape, whatever the cost. 
Third claim: Petitioner contends that counsel's advice 
that petitioner should testify was constitutionally inadequate 
representation. This Court disagrees. As pointed out in 
respondent's brief, based on the circumstances of this case, 
petitioner's testimony was the only way his version of what 
transpired could be given as evidence to the jury and he was 
advised and prepared regarding his testimony. It appears this 
was counsel's strategy. In addition, petitioner wanted to 
testify for that reason. The record does not show any 
disagreement and no complaints were noted. Although this 
strategy may not have produced the desired result, this Court 
cannot find it was ineffective assistance of counsel. (See 
respondent's brief, pp. 12, 13 and 14 for discussion and 
citations). 
Fourth claim: Petitioner contends that counsel was 
ineffective for introducing petitioner's prior criminal history 
on direct examination. Under State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986), petitioner's prior criminal convictions would have 
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been inadmissible unless shown that the probative value 
outweighed the prejudicial effect, and under State v, Bruce. 
779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), the State would be precluded from 
using convictions for theft, robbery and burglary, unless there 
was evidence that the crimes involved dishonesty or false 
statement, or were otherwise more probative than prejudicial. 
This Court is of the opinion Utah's law existent at the time of 
petitioner's trial permitted felony history to be used for 
impeachment purposes, and crimes such as theft, robbery and 
burglary were defined as crimes of dishonesty. Further, as 
pointed out in respondent's brief, the jury was aware that 
petitioner had a previous criminal history because of his 
escape attempt at the time he was shot and the two robbery 
convictions admitted to establish aggravating circumstance. 
The State argues that the introduction of the additional crimes 
was harmless in the face of the weight of evidence regarding 
his guilt. Additionally, there was no showing of any prejudice 
to petitioner. This Court agrees. 
The petitioner points out that the respondent did not 
comment on "Petitioner's approval was required before counsel 
could stipulate to prior convictions used to establish the 
aggravating circumstances in Utah Code Ann., Section 
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76-5-202(1)(A)." Although the State argues that it was not 
unreasonable or prejudicial for counsel's failure to request a 
bifurcated hearing because prior convictions would be 
introduced in the trial on the merits, petitioner contends that 
reasonably effective counsel in a capital case should raise 
questions about improper procedures and occurrences even though 
not ruled upon by an appellate court. The same is true as to 
being aware of the advisory committee note indicating the Utah 
law would be changed if Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence were 
adopted. Further, counsel's Motion to Suppress only dealt with 
"precluding the prosecution from going into the details of 
these crimes. When the Court stated that prosecutors could 
only elicit the fact of conviction and its date and location, 
James Valdez stated, 'That's correct.'" 
Petitioner contends there is a difference as to knowledge 
of being in custody for an unspecified offense at the time of 
the escape attempt and a recitation of his entire criminal 
history. 
Petitioner's above arguments are very strong. The State 
has not adequately covered these arguments. At any rate, those 
arguments must be balanced with the evidence introduced at 
trial, and submitted to this Court for this hearing. As 
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pointed out in respondent's brief, not every possible objection 
that is possible need be made by trial counsel. It was not 
made during this trial. Therefore, it is incumbent upon this 
Court to determine whether such failure in this instance was 
error, and whether that error was prejudicial beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Again, based on the strength of the direct 
evidence regarding petitioner's guilt, the Court finds that 
assistance of counsel may represent some deficiency in the 
above facts, but rules that the deficiency was not prejudicial 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Fifth Claim: Petitioner contends he was prejudiced by 
counsel's failure to request a bifurcated guilt phase to avoid 
introduction of his previous convictions that were used as an 
aggravating circumstance of first degree murder. 
The discussion on the Fourth Claim is applicable here, as 
well as the ruling. This Court agrees with respondent's 
position that there was no requirement to bifurcate the guilt 
phase from the penalty phase where previous convictions were 
introduced to establish an element of the charged offense and 
this Court agrees prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt has not 
been established because of the strength of the direct evidence 
of petitioner's guilt. 
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Sixth Claim: Petitioner contends he was prejudiced because 
counsel did not verify the validity of his guilty pleas to 
these crimes. There is provided no reason or evidence, or even 
claim these guilty pleas were not valid. Ineffectiveness of 
counsel has not been demonstrated for this claim. 
Seventh Claim: Counsel did not place every transaction on 
record. No record was made of disagreements between petitioner 
and counsel about how the case was to be handled and 
petitioner's request that counsel withdraw. Further, was 
petitioner required to object at trial to preserving his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim? State v. Medina, 738 
P.2d 1021 (Utah 1921). 
As criminal cases go, a capital case is unique because the 
life of a human being is placed in jeopardy. Representing a 
defendant charged with a capital offense creates intense 
feelings between the defendant and counsel. There may arise 
disputes over some or every aspect of the trial. Based on the 
evidence presented to this Court, there were disputes between 
petitioner and counsel during the course of counsel's 
representation of petitioner. It is evident that petitioner 
and counseled did not enjoy a completely harmonious 
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relationship. The constant friction that arose between 
petitioner and counsel appeared to be "hot and cold" all during 
the course of the trial, as well as post-trial, as evidenced by 
this Writ. Because of the nature of this relationship , it 
would be difficult for counsel to place on the record all of 
the various disagreements between petitioner and counsel. When 
counsel is attempting to provide the best assistance of counsel 
he is capable of providing but must, in the process, 
continually skirmish with his own client, the Court perceives 
the quandary that results. This is a tough issue to decide, 
in this instance, the Court is not inclined to disturb 
counsel's trial strategy or procedure because the Court can see 
no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt because of the great 
weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt. 
The issue of preserving the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is moot, since this Court is considering such 
claim. Further, there is a record based orv -the trial 
transcripts, as well as the record of this Court's proceedings. 
Eighth Claim: Andy Valdez and Jim Valdez could not 
represent petitioner because they were witnesses and otherwise 
had conflicts of interest. They were witnesses at the scene in 
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front of the courthouse lawn* Both approached petitioner and 
talked to him about each other's safety and witnessed 
petitioner's apprehension. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
(effective January 1, 1988), and the previous Code of 
Professional Conduct prohibit representation because the 
Valdezes were witnesses (Opening Brief, pp. 12-14). The 
Valdezes also knew Nick Kirk and other witnesses (Opening 
Brief, p.15). Although Andy Valdez thought there was a record 
of a waiver, no record has been found. There is no record of 
any conflict issue, that there was animosity between Andy 
Valdez and petitioner, and the fact petitioner asked Andy 
Valdez to withdraw twice (Opening Brief, pp. 16-17). 
Petitioner contends "The State simply ignores this 
contention." Based on the briefs submitted, this Court is of 
the opinion that the problems regarding the Valdezes 
representing petitioner was discussed with petitioner and 
petitioner waived any issue of conflict of interest and 
petitioner agreed to allow the Valdezes to continue their 
representation of petitioner. 
There is still the issue whether independent counsel's 
advice should have been provided to petitioner to advise him of 
the implications of the conflict of interest problem. The 
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Court rules though there may be some evidence of a conflict and 
as a result, some deficiency in representation, because of the 
weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt, there is 
no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. 
b. Penalty phase 
First claim: There was insufficient presentation of 
evidence in mitigation. That "Effective representation of the 
accused in a capital case demands that counsel challenge the 
State's aggravating evidence and present a cohesive and 
understandable theory of mitigation." Petitioner contends this 
was not done. Primarily, there was inadequate investigation 
relating to petitioner's mental health prior to trial. 
Whatever evidence was presented was inadequate — too little 
and too late. There is dispute regarding Dr. Peter 
Heinbecker's testimony. Was there sufficient time and 
sufficient medical or psychological evaluations for Dr. 
Heinbecker to adequately and completely testify in behalf of 
petitioner? The Court is of the opinion there was not. Dr. 
Heinbecker was contacted a mere 24 hours before he testified. 
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During that time he "was able only to examine some of the 
records, interview Mr. Gardner for about one hour, and talk to 
his mother and brother for a total of 2.5 hours." Further, 
"Dr. Heinbecker testified that, in a case of this significance, 
he would have expected more time to prepare his evaluation." 
(Opening Brief, p. 26). 
Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist, evaluated petitioner in 
May 1985. He apparently was not asked to testify for 
petitioner (Opening Brief, p. 28) . Dr. Agnes Plenk was asked 
to evaluate or testify in behalf of petitioner, but she 
declined. No further effort was made to seek professional 
assistance for petitioner, nor seek State assistance in doing 
so. In addition, present counsel's efforts to secure expert 
testimony for petitioner's evaluation was opposed by the State 
and sustained by this Court. As a result, no satisfactory 
mental health evaluation of petitioner has ever been available 
to petitioner to present at any hearing. 
Petitioner contends the deprivation of adequate evaluations 
has prevented petitioner from presenting any evidence of 
possible organic brain damage or other mitigating information 
which further prevented presentation of "a cohesive and 
understandable theory of mitigation." The Court agrees. 
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Second Claim: There was insufficient effort to attack the 
State's aggravating circumstances "as a justification for 
imposing the death penalty." Petitioner lists the following 
deficiencies: 
(1) There was no challenge to Section 76-5-202(1)(c), Utah 
Code Ann. "The actor knowingly created a great risk of death 
to a person other than the victim and the actor." The 
prosecution alleged at trial Macri faced a great risk of 
death. Counsel did not challenge the application of this 
aggravating circumstance, although there was authority that it 
did not apply, merely because Macri was standing next to 
Burdell and had the gun pointed at him briefly. The Court is 
of the opinion this argument is without merit. Not only was 
Macri standing next to Burdell who was shot in extremely close 
proximity, but petitioner shortly thereafter shot Kirk. There 
was no way for Macri or anyone else to know that the weapon in 
petitioner's hand had to be cocked after each discharge, nor 
that he would not shoot anyone else in close proximity. It 
would appear to be naive to suggest that petitioner did not 
knowingly create a great risk of death to anyone present in 
close proximity such as Macri. 
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(2) Counsel did not make an opening statement at the 
penalty phase "which could have countered the effect of the 
negative evidence introduced in the State's case in the penalty 
phase.M 
In retrospect and having the benefit of the entire record, 
waiving the opening statement may appear to be error. But 
during the heat of the trial, many critical decisions must 
quickly be made based on the evidence and counsel's strategy. 
As mentioned previously, the desired result may not have 
materialized, but should not be held against counsel. The 
making of an opening statement at the penalty phase falls in 
this category and this Court is not prepared to disturb such 
decision. 
(3) Counsel did not adequately voir dire the jury. 
Because this was a capital case, individual voir dire should 
have been requested, because of the publicity, and more 
questions should have been asked to determine juror bias. The 
same reasoning as (2) above is applicable here, and the Court 
is not prepared to disturb such decision. 
The Court agrees with respondent that petitioner has not 
established prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt on the above 
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paragraphs (1), (2) , and (3) , and they are, therefore, denied 
on their merits. 
(I) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL 
Based on Mr. Ed Brass's testimony and the submitted briefs, 
this Court is of the opinion there was no conflict of interest 
by Mr. Brass having previously represented Carma Hainsworth and 
having subsequently represented petitioner. The Court has 
considered the matter of identification of the person who 
handed petitioner the gun, and the effect on the jury which 
directly involves Mr. Brass' client, Carma Hainsworth. 
Although not brought to the Supreme Court's attention, nor a 
record made of this, nor waiver received from petitioner, the 
Court is of the opinion Mr. Brass had analyzed the situation 
and determined there was no conflict and the Court agrees with 
his analyses. 
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention there exists 
a conflict of interest on direct appeal from the trial court, 
as well as ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from the 
trial court to the Supreme Court. Neither Mr. Brass, or 
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appellate counsel Ms. Watt, were at fault, but a victim of 
circumstances. 
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that unusual 
circumstances existed to excuse the failure of petitioner to 
raise issues on appeal. 
Mr. Ed Brass was appointed to replace the Salt 
Lake Legal Defenders Association based on 
petitioner's claim he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial and on direct 
appeal. Mr. Brass filed a supplemental brief 
arguing there was no evidentiary record to frame 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In addition, it is not contested that Mr. Brass 
was appointed by the Supreme Court's order, a 
copy of which order he claims not to have 
received, to file a supplemental brief to address 
matters not previously addressed. Consequently, 
based on a telephone conversation with Chief 
Justice Hall, he understood he was appointed only 
to address the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial. Mr. Brass claims to not have 
received a copy of its opinion. 
A further problem exists. 
The Supreme Court's order discharging the Salt 
Lake County Legal Defenders Association was not 
scrupulously honored. Attorney Joan Watt 
testified she was instructed in an informal 
telephone call from the Supreme Court's clerk to 
file the appropriate documents in Mr. Gardner's 
behalf after the decision affirming his 
conviction and sentence was announced. Although 
the Supreme Court had decided that he was 
entitled to independent counsel on the 
ineffective assistance issue, Ms. Watt also 
prepared the Supplemental Petition for Rehearing 
and Supplemental Reply to State's Response to 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, which were 
signed and filed by Mr. Brass. 
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Based on Mr. Brass' understanding, he was appointed to 
represent petitioner on the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial and, further, appellate pleadings were 
prepared by the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, but 
signed by Mr. Brass, even though the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association had previously been discharged in representing 
petitioner. This Court is of the opinion petitioner received 
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because all 
appealable issues were not addressed and there is a question of 
whether issues appealed were properly addressed by independent 
counsel because pleadings were prepared by the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association which had previously been discharged on 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. 
The Court grants petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus on the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
Petitioner should have the opportunity to appeal all issues to 
the Utah State Supreme Court by independent counsel on all 
issues based on independent counsel's own investigation of 
appealable issues and based on independent counsel's own 
research and preparation of appellate documents. 
Petitioner's other issues which he claims he was unable to 
address on appeal have already been dealt with in this 
decision, and therefore need not be addressed any further. 
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(J) FAILURE TO INSTRUCT JURY ON STATUTORY MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
The petitioner's claim the jury was not instructed on all 
appropriate statutory mitigating factors is not supported by 
the evidence in this case. 
The Court is in agreement with the State that: 
The definition of "duress" does not support Mr. 
Gardner's argument that the trial court should 
have included as a mitigating circumstance the 
factor outlined in Utah Code Ann., Section 
76-3-207(2)(c). 
Although force or stress could come from a physical source 
and the Eighth Amendment may require that mitigating 
circumstances be broadly interpreted in favor of the defendant 
and, further, the weight of a specific instruction that Mr. 
Gardner acted under extreme duress carries more weight with the 
jury than the instruction the jury could still consider other 
factors, the Court is of the opinion the jury was sufficiently 
advised they could consider petitioner's condition, as pointed 
out by the State: 
That the jury was instructed that it could 
consider any other facts in aggravation or 
mitigation along with the specifically listed 
factors (R. 613). The jury was also told it 
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could consider as mitigating circumstances which 
did not justify or excuse the crime but which 
they might consider as extenuating or reducing 
moral culpability (R. 614). Thus, the jury was 
free to consider whether the fact that petitioner 
had been wounded mitigated against the death 
penalty. 
The Court rules there was no failure to instruct the jury 
on statutory mitigating circumstances, and if there was, it was 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt based on the weight of 
the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt. 
(K) FAILURE TO INSTRUCT JURY ON THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO 
EXISTENCE OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
As pointed out in State's brief, this issue is a 
"previously unarticulated basis11 for challenging a death 
sentence in Utah. This Court is of the opinion that the trial 
court properly rejected the requested instruction applying the 
reasonable doubt standard to the existence of aggravating 
circumstances. The jury need only find that the total 
aggravation outweighs the total mitigation beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that death is the appropriate penalty in the 
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circumstances of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), (cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982)). 
In summary, petitioner has contended that each error or 
omission collectively and independently deprived petitioner of 
his due process. Because many of the contentions were resolved 
by this Court on the basis of harmless error and thus no 
prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt because of the great weight 
of the direct evidence, petitioner no doubt queries how many 
harmless errors need there be to constitute deprivation of due 
process. The Court has considered this dilemma. The Court has 
weighed each independently, and collectively, and still finds 
that the weight of the direct evidence is so great that the 
collective effect is still insufficient to overcome the 
overwhelming direct evidence of petitioner's guilt. 
Particularly in respect to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, the Court has found no prejudice to petitioner 
beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming direct 
evidence of guilt. As pointed out in respondent's brief, there 
is no necessity to inquire into any deficiency if there is no 
prejudice. Failure to establish either prong of the test 
defeats an ineffectiveness claim. State v. Geary. 707 P.2d 
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645, 646 (Utah 1985). It must not be speculative, but a 
demonstrated reality; the Court is of the opinion such was not 
the case here. 
In conclusion, this Court rules that petitioner's Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or for Post-Conviction Relief 
should be denied except for the penalty phase and the appeal 
phase. In respect to the penalty phase and the appeal phase, 
the Court has found there was ineffective assistance of counsel 
which prejudiced petitioner's case; therefore, the Court grants 
petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or for Post-Conviction 
Relief in respect to the penalty phase and appeal phase. 
Dated this ^-^ dav of July, 1991. 
RAYMOND S. UNO ' 
JUDGE PRO TEM 
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